Conspiracy Theories in Politics
My book Revealing Schemes investigates the role of conspiracy theories in the politics of the post-Soviet region. “Paranoia with a Purpose: Conspiracy Theory and Political Coalitions in Kyrgyzstan” (Post-Soviet Affairs) uses Kyrgyzstan as a case study to show how conspiracy narratives can be used for the construction of political coalitions when institutions fail. “Why the Powerful (in Weak States) Prefer Conspiracy Theories,” appears in the 2018 edited volume, Conspiracy Theories and the People Who Believe Them. It looks at the interplay of historical narratives and political intrigue in three countries Another article, “Is Belief in Conspiracy Theories Pathological? A Survey Experiment on the Cognitive Roots of Extreme Suspicion,” (British Journal of Political Science) investigates the roots of belief in conspiracy theories. It uses an Internet-based survey that experimentally manipulates elements in a fictitious vignette to see what makes people more prone to perceive a conspiracy. A related project looks at the politics of fifth columns globally.
Attitude Formation in Conditions of Limited Information
This line of research investigates the psychological and social sources of mass political attitudes when people lack complete information. I borrow from social psychology and employ experimental methodologies to better understand the factors that shape attitudes and identities, particularly in authoritarian and post-conflict societies. In “Historical Narratives and Post-Conflict Reconciliation: An Experiment in Azerbaijan“, (Conflict Management and Peace Science) I test whether exposure to rival narratives about the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict can shape how Azeris view the possibility of reconciliation with Armenians. Using the same experiment, “Reinterpreting the Enemy: Geopolitical Beliefs and the Attribution of Blame in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict,” in Political Geography, analyzes transcripts from Azeri discussion groups to show how the Soviet legacy influences the ways people think about geopolitics. My article, “Ethnic Cues and Redistributive Preferences in Post-Soviet Georgia,” (Studies in Comparative International Development) explores the factors that influence the salience of ethnic identity. I ask whether certain political claims are more prone to be viewed in ethnic terms, leading to discrimination in attitudes toward redistribution. A US-based survey experiment “Allies or Agitators? How Partisan Identity Shapes Public Opinion about Violent or Nonviolent Protests” shows that perceptions fo the tactics used in protests are subject to partisan bias. It appeared in Political Communication in 2020. A summary of the results appeared in the Washington Post’s Monkey Cage blog.
Social Mobilization
My first book explores how protest can be used as a strategic resource—a “weapon”—by elites located outside the regime in corrupt states. Lacking institutional protections of their power and wealth, independent elites strategically embed themselves in local communities to defend their interests. I show how such elites emerged and led protests against the regime in Kyrgyzstan but not Uzbekistan as a result of political and economic reforms after independence from the USSR. An Author-Critic Forum on the book appeared in Central Asian Survey in 2013. My article, “The Color of Money” (Comparative Politics, 2010), argues that post-Soviet states that underwent early privatization were likely to experience a regime-changing mass uprising in the 2000s due the rise of independent business elites, whereas regimes in non-reforming countries were able to consolidate power unhindered, and were able to pre-empt mass protests. “The Origins of Social Capital” (Comparative Political Studies, 2009), co-authored with Christoph Zuercher and the Jonathan Wheatley, uses an original survey of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan to analyze how regime type influences the components of social capital: networks, norms, and trust.
Informal Networks and the State
Some of my research examines how post-Soviet ruling elites have used informal networks to maintain power, particularly in Central Asia and the Caucasus. “Informal Politics and the State” (Comparative Politics, 2011) lays out a research agenda for studying how informal networks can weaken, substitute for, or work in parallel with, the state. “Oil in the Family” (Democratization, 2012) is a case study analyzing how this has played out in Azerbaijan. I argue that the Azeri leadership was able to stave off opposition challenges by resolving contentious issues among factions within the regime during a potentially fraught presidential transition from father to son, enabling rival factions to close ranks. A chapter for an edited volume Paradox of Power: The Logics of State Weakness in Eurasia, “Power, Peripheries, and Pyramids in Post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan and Georgia” (2017) investigates how leaders in weak states work to project power in their peripheries by prioritizing rapid regime consolidation at the expense of durable state strength. I explore the dual nature of informality in “How Do Tools of Evasion Become Instruments of Exploitation?” It appeared in Alena Ledeneva, ed., Global Encyclopedia of Informality (University College London Press: 2018). An ongoing project seeks to explain patterns of defection and consolidation among elites in Georgia since independence.